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DLD-025        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3175 
___________ 
 
FRANK FORBA, 
                    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-01722) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 27, 2016 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 22, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
  Frank Forba appeals from the District Court’s order granting the motion of  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Thomas Jefferson University Hospital (“Jefferson”) to enforce the parties’ settlement  
agreement.  We will affirm. 
I. 
   Forba was employed by Jefferson from 2001 until 2012.  During that time, he 
took several periods of leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) for 
depression and anxiety.  Jefferson terminated Forba in 2012 on the ground that he 
violated Jefferson’s attendance policy.  Forba, through counsel, later filed suit alleging 
that Jefferson actually terminated him in retaliation for taking FMLA leave.  The parties 
engaged in discovery, and Jefferson filed a motion for summary judgment raising several 
arguments.  Among them was an argument that Forba’s suit was untimely under the 
FMLA’s two-year statute of limitations because Jefferson terminated his employment on 
May 4, 2012, but he did not file suit until April 2, 2015.  Forba did not respond to 
Jefferson’s motion. 
 Against this backdrop, the parties engaged in a settlement conference before a 
Magistrate Judge.  At the conference, the parties orally agreed to a settlement under 
which Jefferson would pay Forba $1,000 in exchange for a full release of his claims.  
Jefferson also agreed to draft and forward to Forba’s counsel a written settlement 
agreement to that effect.  The Magistrate Judge reported the parties’ agreement to the 
District Court, and the District Court entered an order dismissing the action on that basis.
 Approximately two months later, Jefferson filed a motion to enforce the oral 
settlement agreement.  Jefferson asserted that it had forwarded a written settlement 
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agreement to Forba’s counsel but that Forba’s counsel reported that Forba refused to sign 
it.  Forba filed a counseled response in opposition.  Forba attached a declaration stating 
that, “[a]lthough the terms of the settlement were explained to me by [Forba’s counsel] 
and [the Magistrate Judge], I was confused and anxious and because of that I agreed to 
the settlement terms without fully understanding the matter.”  (ECF No. 24-1 at 1-2 ¶ 7.) 
 The District Court then conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing, at which 
Jefferson’s counsel, Forba’s counsel and Forba himself all testified.  Jefferson’s counsel 
testified that, when she called Forba’s counsel to follow up on the settlement agreement, 
he told her that Forba would not sign it because he had “changed his mind.”  Jefferson’s 
counsel also testified that Forba did not appear anxious during the conference, and both 
Jefferson’s counsel and Forba’s counsel testified that the Magistrate Judge fully reviewed 
the terms of the settlement with the parties.  Forba testified that his anxiety prevented him 
from understanding the settlement, but he agreed that he did not raise the issue of his 
anxiety or inability to understand with the Magistrate Judge.  He also testified that his 
anxiety did not prevent him from understanding what occurred during his previous 
deposition or at the evidentiary hearing itself.1 
                                              
1 During the first day of the hearing, concerns arose regarding a potential conflict 
between Forba and his counsel as to the settlement.  In light of those concerns, the 
District Court continued the hearing for approximately one and a half months to give 
Forba an opportunity to consult with different counsel.  Forba consulted with different 
counsel but, when the hearing resumed, Forba elected to proceed pro se.   
 
4 
 
After the hearing, the District Court entered an order granting Jefferson’s motion 
and deeming the parties’ oral settlement agreement enforceable.  The District Court 
explained that it found not credible Forba’s testimony that he did not understand the 
settlement when he agreed to it at the conference and concluded that Forba had merely 
changed his mind.  Forba appeals pro se.2 
II. 
  Forba has filed a response on the issue of possible summary action or dismissal of 
this appeal, along with several motions and other documents with this Court.  Forba’s 
filings, however, are devoted almost entirely to his underlying claims and barely mention 
the settlement that is the only issue on appeal.  Forba’s only mention of the settlement is 
in his supplement to his motion to stay the District Court’s order.  In that filing, he asserts 
that “I did not agree to any of the terms and conditions” and “I did not agree to settle my 
case with Jefferson Hospital for $1000.00[.]”  (Appellant’s Supp. Mot. to Stay at 1) 
(emphasis added).  Those assertions are at odds with Forba’s declaration and testimony 
below, and he provides no support for them.  Nor has he raised anything calling the 
District Court’s enforcement of the settlement into question.  Nevertheless, we have 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s findings 
of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.  See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. 
Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2002).  After filing his notice of appeal, Forba filed 
a motion for reconsideration and other relief.  The District Court denied that motion for 
lack of jurisdiction, but Forba did not file another or an amended notice of appeal as 
required to challenge that ruling, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), and his time to do so 
has expired.  For the District Court’s benefit, however, we note that district courts retain 
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reviewed the available record3 and will affirm primarily for the reasons explained by the 
District Court.  We add only three observations.  First, under applicable Pennsylvania 
law, one of the factors that is relevant in determining a person’s mental competence to 
enter into a settlement and release is the amount paid for the release.  See Taylor v. Avi, 
415 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).  At the time of the settlement in this case, Forba 
was seeking almost four years of backpay and reinstatement to his position.  Thus, it may 
seem implausible at first blush that Forba would have knowingly released these claims in 
exchange for $1,000.   
The District Court did not expressly address this issue.  As the District Court 
explained, however, the parties’ settlement discussions occurred against the backdrop of 
Jefferson’s motion for summary judgment.  That motion raised several potentially 
dispositive arguments to which Forba never responded, and it could have resulted in a 
complete judgment in Jefferson’s favor.  It is not implausible that Forba would have 
released his claims for $1,000 against that backdrop.    
Second, it appears that Forba submitted to the District Court a potentially relevant 
note from a therapist but that the District Court did not admit it into evidence.  In its 
                                                                                                                                                  
jurisdiction to consider timely motions for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 
notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). 
3 Only the first day of the hearing has been transcribed.  Forba neither ordered the 
complete transcript as required by Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(1), nor filed a motion for 
transcripts at the Government’s expense.  In any event, Forba has not raised any 
argument requiring review of the complete transcript, and we see nothing suggesting that 
such review might provide a basis for disturbing the District Court’s ruling. 
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opinion, the District Court stated that Forba hand-delivered several documents shortly 
before the second day of the hearing and that the documents included “ a handwritten 
note of a therapist allegedly treating Mr. Forba for several years but who only reported 
Mr. Forba’s statements to her after our first hearing.”  (ECF No. 29 at 5.)  The District 
Court further explained that Forba attempted to offer the documents into evidence but 
that it sustained Jefferson’s objection because the documents were not probative of 
Forba’s understanding of the settlement.  (Id.) 
The note to which the District Court referred appears to be the same undated, 
handwritten note attached to Forba’s motion for reconsideration at ECF No. 35-1, page 
46.  That note is from a therapist who treated Forba both before and after the settlement 
conference.  As the District Court observed, the note largely reports Forba’s own 
statements to the therapist that his anxiety during the settlement conference prevented 
him from understanding the settlement.  The note closes, however, with the assertion that 
“[t]he impact of [Forba’s] anxiety on his absorption of information at the settlement 
conference obstructed his goal of pursuing a just outcome.”  Forba’s therapist, whom 
Forba did not call as a witness, did not explain the basis for forming any independent 
opinion to that effect and did not affirmatively opine that Forba did not understand the  
settlement on the day of the settlement conference. 
The District Court did not specifically discuss that statement.  Even if the District 
Court should have admitted the note into evidence, however, any error in that regard was 
harmless.  As the District Court explained, “a person’s mental capacity is best determined 
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by his spoken words and his conduct, and . . . the testimony of persons who observed 
such conduct on the date in question out-ranks testimony as to observations made prior to 
and subsequent to that date.”  Sobel v. Sobel, 254 A.2d 649, 651 (Pa. 1969); see also 
Elliott v. Clawson, 204 A.2d 272, 273 (Pa. 1964) (rejecting medical testimony that 
contracting part was not competent where, inter alia, the witness “did not examine him on 
the day of the conveyance”).   
In this case, Jefferson’s counsel testified that Forba did not appear anxious at the 
settlement conference.  The only evidence that Forba was unable to understand the 
settlement was his testimony to that effect, but Forba also testified that he did not raise 
that issue with the Magistrate Judge and that his anxiety had not prevented him from 
understanding other stages of the proceeding.  Thus, the District Court found Forba’s 
testimony regarding a lack of understanding not credible and concluded that Forba had 
simply changed his mind.  To the extent that the note from Forba’s therapist can be read 
to express an independent opinion on these matter, it is too conclusory to support a 
contrary finding. 
Finally, as the District Court appreciated, the mere fact that Forba may have 
suffered from depression and anxiety in general does not require the conclusion that he 
did not understand the settlement.  “Mere mental weakness, if it does not amount to 
inability to comprehend the contract, and is unaccompanied by evidence of imposition or 
undue influence, is insufficient to set aside a contract.”  Estate of McGovern v. Commw. 
State Emps.’ Ret. Bd., 517 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. 1986) (quotation marks omitted), 
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overruled in part on other grounds by Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers Comp. App. 
Bd., 812 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002).  Forba presented no such evidence in this case.  
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Forba’s 
pending motions are denied.
